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Abstract: Because the basic unit of biology is the cell, biological knowledge is rooted in the epistemology of the cell, and 
because life is the salient characteristic of the cell, its epistemology must be centered on its livingness, not its constituent 
components. The organization and regulation of these components in the pursuit of life constitute the fundamental nature 
of the cell. Thus, regulation sits at the heart of biological knowledge of the cell and the extraordinary complexity of this 
regulation conditions the kind of knowledge that can be obtained, in particular, the representation and intelligibility of that 
knowledge. This paper is essentially split into two parts. The first part discusses the inadequacy of everyday intelligibility 
and intuition in science and the consequent need for scientific theories to be expressed mathematically without appeal to 
commonsense categories of understanding, such as causality. Having set the backdrop, the second part addresses biologi-
cal knowledge. It briefly reviews modern scientific epistemology from a general perspective and then turns to the episte-
mology of the cell. In analogy with a multi-faceted factory, the cell utilizes a highly parallel distributed control system to 
maintain its organization and regulate its dynamical operation in the face of both internal and external changes. Hence, 
scientific knowledge is constituted by the mathematics of stochastic dynamical systems, which model the overall rela-
tional structure of the cell and how these structures evolve over time, stochasticity being a consequence of the need to ig-
nore a large number of factors while modeling relatively few in an extremely complex environment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
  As energy and matter lie at the basis of physical knowl-
edge, the cell, as the basic unit of life, lies at the basis of 
biological knowledge and, therefore, ones epistemological 
stance towards the cell shapes ones understanding of the 
nature of biological knowledge. Since the epistemology of 
the cell must lie within in a wider scientific epistemology, 
scientific knowledge of the cell must satisfy the constraints 
applying to scientific knowledge in general. The intention of 
this paper is to articulate a properly biological epistemology 
of the cell, as opposed to merely viewing the cell as a prod-
uct of many physical/chemical reactions without recognizing 
that these interactions must be regulated by the cellular com-
ponents towards specific goal states that may be aimed at 
producing a cell locked into a particular differentiated state 
or shifting the cell to another differentiated state. This means 
viewing the cell as a system that fulfills the functions neces-
sary for survival, such as regulation of protein production, 
communication among components within the cell and with 
extracellular components within the organism, information 
integration, response to external signals, self-organization in 
response to internal changes or external stimuli, and repro-
duction.  
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  Over the last seventy-five years, science and engineering 
have gained extensive experience modeling systems possess-
ing these kinds of characteristics; indeed, we will formulate 
the epistemology of the cell in analogy with humanly con-
structed systems. In doing so we will address the two most 
fundamental epistemological questions arising relative to 
biology as a science: (1) What form does biological knowl-
edge take? (2) How is biological knowledge validated?  
  Before confronting these questions, we will direct our 
attention to a basic issue whose appreciation is prerequisite 
to developing a modern biology grounded on a sound scien-
tific epistemology. One might refer to this issue as intelligi-
bility. Are there categories of understanding that allow the 
formulation of biological science in terms that are intrinsic to 
Nature? Put another way, should we expect biology, as a 
manifestation of Nature, to be intelligible, in the sense that 
the mental models that constitute biological science make 
sense relative to our everyday interaction with natural phe-
nomena?  
PREDICTION IN BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
  Biology became a discrete field of science with Darwin’s 
publication of On the Origin of Species, this being the first 
fairly comprehensive way of describing the characteristics 
that discriminate biology from chemistry and physics. Biol-
ogy is the study of organisms, physical systems capable of 
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utilize available energy to organize matter for facilitation of 
their own persistence and reproduction. Reproduction can 
involve the passing on of slightly varied copies of the infor-
mation as well as the combining of information from indi-
viduals possessing somewhat different sets of information. 
This constantly generated variance in organisms over time 
can produce different levels of fitness of the offspring organ-
isms for particular environments. If the differences are suffi-
ciently large to be a selective advantage, such variances can 
spread throughout the population of the organisms.  
  The appearance of a theory of evolution in combination 
with a growing appreciation of the magnitude of the changes 
in extant organisms over time, through studies of the fossil 
record, served to focus attention on biology as a very long-
running, continuous process. This in turn raised questions 
about how the information in organisms is coded and used to 
produce the range of capabilities within and across organ-
isms. The clear adaptation of organisms to their environ-
ments raised questions about how the processes operating in 
biological systems are controlled to allow highly variable 
responses appropriate to both rapid and long-term changes in 
the environment. The persistence of organisms focused at-
tention on how the extraordinarily complex biological proc-
esses required for an organism’s survival could be made suf-
ficiently robust to account for long life-spans. 
  As in physics, the first types of relationships character-
ized in biology were ones where the process involved relied 
on simple, linear relationships. Study of the metabolic prod-
ucts common in organisms was an early and fruitful branch 
of chemical research, and by the beginning of the 1900’s, 
clear patterns of Mendelian heredity could be seen for dis-
eases such as alcaptonuria, where the enzyme that catabo-
lizes homogentisic acid is inactive and persons with the dis-
ease produce black urine, a result of the oxidation of ex-
creted homogentisic acid. The general method of associating 
mutations of specific enzymes with failures to metabolize a 
particular substrate, biochemical genetics, was extremely 
successful in producing a clear understanding of the stepwise 
enzymatic manipulation of small molecules involved in 
anabolism, catabolism, and energy production.  
  The prodigious success of biochemical genetics along 
with its very intuitive, easily understood methodology has 
deeply influenced how biologists think about and approach 
the study of biological processes. Metabolic processing relies 
on chains of enzymatic transformation of small molecules, 
where each step in the process is obligatory and each is typi-
cally carried out by a single catalytic entity. The processing 
is extremely efficient, with very little redundancy of activity 
and only modest branching and merging of the process 
chains. Much of the regulation of metabolic pathways is car-
ried out at the level of the individual steps through feedback 
based on product levels, where either the amounts of enzyme 
made or the activity level of the enzyme are adjusted de-
pending on changes in the concentration of its metabolic 
product. In analogy to physics, anywhere in biology that 
simple linear relationships are an appropriate approximation 
of the key interactions responsible for a particular phenome-
non, model building is rapid and produces useful predictions 
that enable control. Unfortunately, biologists now face the 
barrier that confronted physics at the end of the 19
th century: 
most processes have sufficiently many conditioning influ-
ences that simple linear relationships cannot produce useful 
predictive models for them. 
  In facing the physicists’ dilemma, biologists will have to 
struggle with the same sorts of discomfort that the physics 
research community still endures. We possess a deeply 
rooted desire to visualize the relationships we are trying to 
characterize as simple relationships whose effects are easily 
intuited once a descriptive model is constructed. In physics, 
this desire can be best illustrated in the study of gravity. 
Newton’s model is very straightforward and can be thought 
of in a way that appeals to our own commonsense descrip-
tion of the world, namely, things fall as though attracted in 
some way to the earth. However, by 1900, there was suffi-
cient experimental data to show that predictions made con-
cerning Mercury’s orbital precession using this simple dis-
tance attenuated, attractive force model were sufficiently 
inaccurate to warrant reconsidering the model. Most effort 
was aimed at trying to find an explanation of the discrepancy 
that would fit within the Newtonian model. In the end, only a 
very different model, Einstein’s, was able to produce a better 
fit and make new predictions beyond the reach of the old 
model, such as gravitational lensing, and thus become the 
model of choice. In getting to this model, all of the comfort-
able assumptions about invariance in time and space had to 
be rejected, and as in quantum-mechanical physics, much of 
our universe became alien and non-intuitive. Recently, as 
physicists have been acquiring more and better data on larger 
scale objects, such as galaxies, discrepancies from the Ein-
stein model have arisen and are provoking the same desires 
to find an accommodating explanation or produce a theory 
with a substantial difference. In the current phase, there are 
competing hypotheses, such as one that would remove the 
discrepancies by assuming that 94% of the universe is com-
posed of “dark” matter that can only be sensed indirectly and 
one that would alter the way in which gravitational force 
changes over distance [1]. Whatever change eventually oc-
curs will further distance us from our intuitive understand-
ings.  
  Acceptance of the need for models that will not provide 
biologists the simple and intuitive pictures of what they are 
studying will no doubt prove as difficult as it has been in 
physics. Even now, where it seems clear that the models 
physicists can produce will always be provisional, with new 
and different forms of data showing that the existing model 
only provides usefully accurate predictions for some re-
stricted range of situations where further possible complica-
tions are not in play, there remain practitioners who expect 
there to be a simple grand unifying theory that will yet pro-
vide a simple and intuitive model of everything. Biologists, 
like physicists, must confront the issue of intelligibility. Ow-
ing to its special role in the ancient and medieval concept of 
the knowledge of Nature, causality plays a central role in our 
investigations, and that is where we begin.  
CAUSALITY 
  The metaphysical character of causality has become ever 
clearer since the birth of modern science with Galileo. It 
plays no role in his scientific theories or in those of Isaac 
Newton. By 1913, Bertrand Russell could write, “The law of 
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losophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the mon-
archy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no 
harm” [2]. Whereas Russell focused his criticism on the dif-
ficulty of defining causality meaningful to phenomena, a 
couple of decades later Erwin Schrodinger emphasizes the 
empirical vacuity of causality when he writes, “It can never 
be decided experimentally whether causality in Nature is 
‘true’ or ‘untrue’. The relation of cause and effect, as Hume 
pointed out long ago, is not something that we find in Nature 
but is rather a characteristic of the way in which we regard 
Nature” [3]. Both Russell and Schrodinger follow in the 
wake of David Hume’s devastating criticism of causality of 
being neither logically nor empirically grounded.  
  One would have thought the matter settled; however, it 
appears that Russell’s “relic of a bygone age” hangs on in 
biology. In a recent editorial entitled, “Biocomplexity as a 
Challenge for Biological Theory,” Werner Callebaut and 
Manfred Laubichler train their sights directly on Schrodinger 
when, discussing [4], they write, “Causation is still regarded 
here, with Hume and Kant, as ‘a characteristic of the way in 
which we regard Nature’ rather than intrinsic to Nature, 
which amounts to nothing less than renouncing knowledge 
of Nature itself” [5]. Not only do they assert causality but, in 
claiming that Hume, Kant, and Schrodinger renounce 
“knowledge of Nature itself,” argue for a return to pre-
Galilean science since neither Galileo nor Newton required 
causal explanation for scientific knowledge. The statement is 
particularly perplexing because it is not made in reference to 
simple relationships that may admit deterministic modeling, 
but in the context of the extreme complexity confronting 
biological research, precisely the kind of massive-variable 
setting in which deterministic models fail most miserably. 
Looking back on three-quarters of a century of the success of 
modeling complex interacting phenomena using stochastic 
dynamical systems, it should be obvious that future success 
in biology depends on the application of such systems to the 
machinery of the cell.  
  While Callebaut and Laubichler’s demand for causality is 
certainly a striking rejection of modern science in favor of a 
return to medieval science, it is not isolated. Even when 
questioning causality in biology, Ernst Mayr acknowledges 
causality at the level of the cell when he writes, 
  Most of the standard treatments of causality in the 
philosophical literature are based on problems in 
physics, where the effect of laws, such as those of 
gravity and thermodynamics may give an unambigu-
ous answer to the question “What is the cause of…?’ 
However, such a simple solution is rarely available in 
biology except at the cellular-molecular level [6]. 
This is a strange statement because the question “What is the 
cause of…?” is never asked in physics, nor can it be asked in 
any scientifically meaningful way. Be that as it may, the no-
tion that a “simple solution” based on causality could even 
be entertained in the extraordinary complexity of the cell 
simply ignores the last 100 years of science.  
  Philosophers might speculate on some vague notion of 
causality underlying physical phenomena but such specula-
tions are not part of science. In Theory of Random Functions, 
Vladimir Pugachev accepts the philosophical stance that 
phenomenological inter-dependence is a fundamental law of 
dialectical materialism, but then he goes on to explain the 
compatibility of that determinist metaphysical position with 
a stochastic scientific epistemology:  
  By virtue of this [law], each observable phenomenon 
is causally related to innumerable other phenomena 
and its pattern of development depends on a multi-
plicity of factors... Only a limited number of these 
factors can be established and traced. For this reason, 
if we observe the same phenomenon many times, it is 
seen that besides its general properties, there are cer-
tain special features which are only typical of a par-
ticular observation [7]. 
To wit, even under the assumption of determinism as a world 
view, successful modeling of complex phenomena requires 
stochasticity owing to the complexity. The assumption of a 
stochastic model is a scientific decision, not a metaphysical 
perspective. Andrei Kolmogorov, during the period when he 
was laying down the foundations of modern probability the-
ory, states the matter concisely: “The possibility of using, in 
the treatment of a real process, schemes of well-determined 
or of only stochastically definite processes stands in no rela-
tion to the question whether the real process is itself deter-
mined or random” [8]. The so-called “real process” is not a 
subject of scientific knowledge. The question of whether cell 
function is deterministic or stochastic is not a scientific ques-
tion and, even if cell function were deterministic, it would be 
highly unlikely that this determinism would be reflected in a 
gene network since the genes in the model would undoubt-
edly be affected by events (latent variables), including genes, 
outside the model, thereby imparting a stochastic nature to 
the model. This recognition is critical to the science of the 
cell and to translational science related to controlling cell 
behavior. 
  Having begun with some remarks about the present, let 
us go back and start from the beginning. In Book III of the 
Physics, Aristotle writes, “Knowledge is the object of our 
inquiry, and men do not think they know a thing till they 
have grasped the ‘why’ of it (which is to grasp its primary 
cause)” [9]. For Aristotle, causality has to do with providing 
categories of explanation. Knowledge is explanation sur-
rounding the question of why and based on four causes, 
which, according to Aristotle, “perhaps exhausts the number 
of ways in which the term ‘cause’ is used”. A material cause 
is “that out of which a thing comes to be and persists”. It is 
“the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the gen-
era of which the bronze and the silver are species”. A formal 
cause is “the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the 
essence, and its genera… and the parts in the definition”. An 
efficient cause is “the primary source of the change or com-
ing to rest; e. g. the man who gave advice is a cause, the fa-
ther is the cause of the child, and generally what makes of 
what is made and what causes change of what is changed”. A 
final cause is “the end, or that for the sake of which a thing is 
done, e. g. health is the cause of walking about…. The same 
is true also of all the intermediate steps that are brought 
about through the action of something else as means toward 
the end”. Of the four causes, only Aristotle’s efficient cause 
is in accord with current common usage. For Aristotle, there 
is no clear demarcation between physics and metaphysics, so 
that the same causal categories are stated in both the Physics 
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 In  the  New Organon, Francis Bacon agrees with Aristotle 
that causality is the ground of knowledge when he writes, “It 
is a correct position that true knowledge is knowledge by 
causes” [10]; however, he separates Aristotle’s four causes 
as to whether they apply to physics or metaphysics: material 
and efficient causes to physics, formal and final causes to 
metaphysics. But Bacon does not demarcate between science 
and metaphysics. While he sees no place for final causes in 
science, his preference for authentic scientific understanding 
lies with formal causes. In the New Organon he writes, “The 
efficient and the material (as they are investigated and re-
ceived, that is, as remote causes, without reference to the 
latent process leading to the form) are but slight and superfi-
cial, and contribute little, if anything, to true and active sci-
ence” [10]. Bacon separates physics from metaphysics, but it 
is within the domain of the latter where “true and active sci-
ence” resides. Knowing the material out of which something 
comes to be or the source of change for a body’s change of 
motion is “superficial” in comparison to knowledge of form.  
  Bacon desires a method to ascertain scientific truth based 
on experiment, not the abstract reasoning common in the 
medieval period or the anecdotal observations of ordinary 
experience. Given that true knowledge rests upon causality, 
then the form of knowledge and its acquirement should con-
form to causal relation. Thus, causality becomes inextricably 
linked to induction: when we observe that event B follows 
whenever event A is observed, then a cause-and-effect rela-
tion is in some sense logically induced between A and B. 
This relation goes beyond the list of observations to a deeper 
knowledge of reality. For Bacon, scientific knowledge is 
causal knowledge and this knowledge is reached by the 
“logical” process of induction upon observing one event, the 
effect, repeatedly following the other, the cause, without 
exception. Bacon recognizes that haphazard observation will 
not yield the kind of structured observations that lead to the 
discovery of inductive relationships. Therefore, he proposes 
that experiments be carried out in a ways to reveal sequences 
of events from which to induce causal relations.  
  The relationship between causality and science takes a 
modern turn with Galileo, whose Two New Sciences ap-
peared in 1632, twelve years after the New Organon. Galileo 
recognizes that science concerns quantifiable relations 
among phenomena. He does not deny causality; rather, he 
sets the issue aside and gets on with pragmatic description. 
In  Two New Sciences, Galileo puts these words into the 
mouth of Salviati:  
  The present does not seem to me to be an opportune 
time to enter into the investigation of the cause of the 
acceleration of natural motion, concerning which 
various philosophers have produced various opin-
ions…. For the present, it suffices our Author that we 
understand him to want us to investigate and demon-
strate some attributes of a motion so accelerated 
(whatever be the cause of its acceleration)…. [11]. 
In the terminology of phenomenology, Galileo brackets cau-
sality, ignores it, and gets on with the business of quantita-
tive description. Although Galileo does not do away with 
causality, he rejects it as a requirement for knowledge. 
  In general, Galileo is dissatisfied with words. These con-
stitute ersatz knowledge, the result being both an illusion of 
knowledge and an impediment to actual knowledge owing to 
satisfaction with empty phrases. When the Aristotelian Sim-
plicio comments that everyone knows that bodies fall on 
account of gravity, Salviati responds,  
  You are wrong, Simplicio; you should say that every-
one knows that it is called ‘gravity’. But I am not ask-
ing you for the name, but the essence of the thing. Of 
this you know not a bit more than you know the es-
sence of the mover of the stars in gyration. We don’t 
really understand what principle or what power it is 
that moves a stone downwards, any more than we un-
derstand what moves it upwards after it has left the 
projector, or what moves the moon round [11]. 
Perhaps causality is operating here, but to simply say that 
there is a cause and to name it provides no knowledge.  
  The issue of gravity comes to the fore when Isaac New-
ton formulates a mathematical law of gravitation that relates 
the distance, mass, and acceleration. The gravitational law is 
relational, mathematical, and idealized insofar as, when put 
into practice, it ignores confounding effects such as air resis-
tance. It can be related to observations via experiment. The 
gravitational law mathematically characterizes a relation in 
such a way that the relation can be can used to make predic-
tions, thereby providing a means for validation and for appli-
cation. The mathematical structure represents a form of 
knowledge that is precise, inter-subjective, and operational. 
What it omits is any reference to some physical process be-
hind the relation, in particular, to the cause of the accelera-
tion. Russell writes, “In the motions of mutually gravitating 
bodies, there is nothing that can be called a cause, and noth-
ing that can be called an effect; there is merely a formula” 
[2]. Like Galileo, Newton is not denying causality; he is 
bracketing it. Like Galileo, he is breaking with Aristotle and 
Bacon in formulating knowledge that does not depend on 
causality. Newton makes his intent clear In The Principia: 
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy: 
  For I here design only to give a mathematical notion 
of these forces, without considering their physical 
causes and seats….It is enough that gravity does 
really exist, and acts according to the laws which we 
have explained, and abundantly serves to account for 
all the motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea 
[12]. 
Newton recognizes that the need to limit oneself to a set of 
factors to arrive at mathematical representations of relations 
between phenomena imparts necessary limitations to scien-
tific theories: 
  But our purpose is only to trace out the quantity and 
properties of this force from the phenomena, and to 
apply what we discover in some simple cases as prin-
ciples, by which, in a mathematical way, we may es-
timate the effects thereof in more involved cases: for 
it would be endless and impossible to bring every par-
ticular to direct and immediate observation. We said, 
in a mathematical way, to avoid all questions about 
the nature or quality of this force [12]. 
  The knowledge of which Newton speaks is mathematical, 
but it is not mathematics devoid of relation to human experi-
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tion. The critical epistemological point is that the model is 
not meant to include all factors, but is of sufficient predictive 
power that it can “estimate” effects in a more general setting.  
  When Galileo and Newton bracket causality, they begin a 
search for non-causal knowledge, thereby going beyond Ar-
istotle and bringing about a radical change in epistemology; 
however, they do not come to grips with the meaning of cau-
sality. In particular, are a cause and its effect merely related 
via temporal priority, with the cause prior to the effect, or is 
there more than temporal contiguity? Is there a necessary 
connection between the cause and the effect? David Hume 
argues that in using the phrase “cause and effect” we mean 
the latter. In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 
he writes: 
  When one particular species of events has always, in 
all instances, been conjoined with another, we make 
no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the ap-
pearance of the other, and of employing that reason-
ing, which alone can assure us of any matter of fact or 
existence. We then call one object, Cause; and the 
other, Effect. We suppose that there is some connex-
ion between them; some power in the one, by which it 
infallibly produces the other, and operates with the 
greatest certainty and strongest necessity [13]. 
  Does repeated observation of conjoined events warrant 
the supposition of a necessary connection? Is there a ground 
in reason or a physical ground for judging there to be a nec-
essary connection? Hume states emphatically that there is no 
such ground. Belief in causality rests not on reason, but on 
habit. He writes, 
  But there is nothing in a number of instances, differ-
ent from every single instance, which is supposed to 
be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition 
of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, 
upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual 
attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This con-
nexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this cus-
tomary transition of the imagination from one object 
to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression 
from which we form the idea of power or necessary 
connexion. Nothing farther is in the case [13]. 
Repetition may lead to increased expectation, but not neces-
sity – and certainly not to some deeper relationship. Induc-
tion does not depend upon causality; in fact, it is the oppo-
site. Belief in causality is itself an unwarranted leap from 
repeated observations. 
  Modernity fully arrives with Hume. He does not bracket 
causality as a scientific category; he dismisses it as a scien-
tific category by showing that it has no grounding in reason 
or in Nature, at least insofar as is empirically discernable. 
Necessary connections are subjective impressions, not objec-
tive relations. Observations lead to expectation, a probabilis-
tic category, not to certainty. Scientific certitude is a fiction, 
a product of a leap of thought. Two centuries later, Schrod-
inger agrees with Hume and writes that “the relation of cause 
and effect is a characteristic of the way in which we regard 
Nature” [3]. 
  Immanuel Kant also agrees with Hume that the principle 
of causality is not a product of reason. In the Prolegomena to 
any Future Metaphysics, he writes, “[Hume] justly maintains 
that we cannot comprehend by reason the possibility of cau-
sality, that is, of the reference of the existence of one thing to 
the existence of another, which is necessitated by the for-
mer” [14]. However, whereas for Hume, habit underlies be-
lief in causality, for Kant, causality is a category of under-
standing. It is a form imposed on phenomena by the nature 
of the human mind. The mind imposes forms on the data of 
sensation, and scientific knowledge is limited by these 
forms. The way things appear, such as being spatially coor-
dinated and connected by causality, are due to subjective a 
priori conditions for knowledge. One cannot know things 
apart from the manner in which they conform to these a pri-
ori mental forms. Of these categories of understanding, of 
which causality is one, Kant writes in the Critique of Pure 
Reason,  
  Now the question is whether there do not exist, a pri- 
ori in the mind, conceptions of understanding also, as  
conditions under which alone something, if not intu- 
ited, is yet thought as object. If this question be an- 
swered in the affirmative, it follows that all empirical  
cognition of objects is necessarily conformable to   
such conceptions, since, if they are not presupposed,  
it is impossible that anything can be an object of ex- 
perience. Now all experience contains, besides the in- 
tuition of the senses through which an object is given,  
a conception also of an object that is given in intui- 
tion. Accordingly, conceptions of objects in general  
must lie as a priori conditions at the foundation of all  
empirical cognition; and consequently, the objective  
validity of the categories, as a priori conceptions, will  
rest upon this, that experience (as far as regards the  
form of thought) is possible only by their means. For  
in that case they apply necessarily and a priori to ob- 
jects of experience, because only through them can an  
object of experience be thought [15]. 
Only through the categories can an object of experience be 
thought. Hence, the mind’s structure imposes causality on 
our experiences as a prior condition for thinking about the 
experiences. 
  Kant’s argument imposes causality upon the phenomena 
we experience but not on the things-in-themselves that un-
derlie the phenomena, the noumena, as he calls them. We 
cannot experience the things-in-themselves because they lie 
outside our sense experience. Kant asserts the existence of 
things-in-themselves, which for a strict empiricist like Hume 
cannot be asserted. Kant does not ascribe causality to the 
things-in-themselves, only to the phenomena we experience, 
and that because our minds impose causality on the phenom-
ena as a condition of thinking about them. Whereas Galileo 
and Newton bracket causality, Kant moves it from Nature to 
the mind.  
  From a scientific perspective, Kant takes a step back-
wards by making causality, not expectation, a category of 
understanding. Hume has already seen that the actual cate-
gory of understanding is expectation. Observation of event A 
leads to the expectation of event B. Hume sees correctly that 
expectation is a probabilistic concept. There is no reason to 
raise the idea of causality. Why go beyond saying that upon 
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  Putting aside causality, Kant makes at least three key 
points regarding science. First, he insists that mind imposes 
human categories on the way in which Nature is understood. 
Experience does not arrive qua experience; rather, as human 
experience it arrives via the structure of the human mind. 
Kant puts mind, as an organizing and connecting entity, prior 
to experience. Second, he argues that, whatever ultimately 
lies behind the phenomena is outside the domain of science. 
A strict empiricist like Hume dogmatically asserts that one 
cannot speak of anything lying behind the phenomena. Kant 
argues otherwise and, in doing so, is more in line with New-
ton; who believes that gravity exists, although he can say 
nothing about it except what is revealed by the mathematical 
formulae expressing phenomenal relations. Third, Kant con-
tends that science is a product of the human mind and, be-
cause science is limited by its epistemology, the mind is only 
bound to the conclusions of science when it operates within 
the categories of understanding, which themselves are lim-
ited to phenomenal experience, and therefore are not opera-
tive outside the domain of that experience. This is a strong 
statement regarding limitations of human understanding   
because it says that the categories of understanding, which  
apply to phenomena, cannot be legitimately applied outside 
phenomena. Metaphysics is not ruled out, but generalizing 
phenomenal categories to metaphysics is not legitimate.  
  Whereas Kant sees Hume’s arguments concerning the 
lack of empirical ground for causality as definitive, the em-
piricist John Stuart Mill wishes to empirically ground sci-
ence in the aftermath of Hume, which, for him, means 
grounding induction and, in turn, causality. In A System of 
Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, he gives his definition: 
  The Law of Causation, the recognition of which is the 
main pillar of inductive science, is but the familiar 
truth that invariability of succession is found by ob-
servation to obtain between every fact in nature and 
some other fact which has preceded it, independently 
of all considerations respecting the ultimate mode of 
production of phenomena, and of every other question 
regarding the nature of ‘Things in themselves’ [16]. 
  There are four fundamental points regarding Mill’s view: 
(1) no necessary connection is implied by causality; (2) the 
effect must be the “invariably and unconditionally conse-
quent” of the cause; (3) causality makes no reference to what 
is behind the phenomena; and (4) causality is “coextensive 
with human experience.” Mill escapes Hume’s criticism by 
abandoning any notion of necessary connection and making 
induction purely sequential, but misses Hume’s salient scien-
tific point, the impossibility of arriving at the unconditional 
invariability of succession by any finite number of observa-
tions.  
  Mill recognizes that the causality cannot be as simple as 
that of a single event being the sole cause of an effect. 
Regarding the complexity of causation, he writes,  
  But the real cause is the whole of the antecedents, the 
whole of the contingencies of every description, 
which being realized, the consequent invariably fol-
lows. Yet even invariable sequence is not synony-
mous with causation. The sequence, besides being in-
variable, must be unconditional [16].  
Clearly, “the whole of the antecedents, the whole of the con-
tingencies of every description” has no bounds and may very 
well be the entire universe, which would reduce the entire 
notion of cause and effect to a statement about universal de-
terminism, a position taken by Mill. But if causality depends 
on knowing all the antecedents composing a cause, then 
surely it is not coextensive with human experience. On the 
other hand, expectation is very much coextensive with hu-
man experience.  
  Mill recognizes that, when applying induction in the 
course of scientific discovery, haphazard observation will 
not do. He writes, “Experimentation has great advantages 
over observation in that it often enables us to obtain innu-
merable combinations of circumstances which are not to be 
found in nature” [16]. But instead of the Galilean-Newtonian 
recognition that experimental constraint leads to relations 
that “estimate” relations among naturally occurring phenom-
ena, Mill wants to use experiment to obtain “innumerable 
combinations of circumstances”, a goal that on its face is 
impossible.  
  In trying to circumvent Hume’s attack on causality on 
strictly empiricist grounds, Mill returns to a pre-Galilean 
world in the sense that, although necessary connection is 
abjured, causality remains a requirement for knowledge. 
Hume’s analysis regarding uncertainty and the impossibility 
of concluding a necessary connection, one that is uncondi-
tional and invariable, is impenetrable because the certainty of 
formal logic does not apply to human interaction with Na-
ture. Expectation, not causality, is coextensive with human 
experience.  
  In his essay, “On the Notion of Cause”, Russell demon-
strates the impossibility of giving precise meaning to several 
different attempts to define “cause”. He settles on the previ-
ously cited definition of Mill as perhaps the best attempt at a 
viable definition: “The Law of Causation, the recognition of 
which is the main pillar of inductive science, is but the famil-
iar truth that invariability of succession is found by observa-
tion to obtain between every fact in nature and some other 
fact which has preceded it” [16]. But this attempt fails owing 
to the impossibility of supplying it with a suitable notion of 
event and the “insuperable difficulties”, which Russell care-
fully articulates, of trying to define the timing between a 
cause and an effect. Recognizing that Mill’s reasoning re-
garding induction and causality are based on the appearance 
of uniformities in nature, Russell acknowledges such, even 
to the possibility that no exception has ever been witnessed. 
Nonetheless, he writes, 
  What I deny is that science assumes the existence of 
invariable uniformities of sequence of this kind, or 
that it aims at discovering them. All such uniformi-
ties, as we saw, depend upon a certain vagueness in 
the definition of the ‘events’… The principle ‘same 
cause, same effect,’ which philosophers imagine to be 
vital to science, is therefore utterly otiose. As soon as 
the antecedents have been given sufficiently fully to 
enable the consequent to be calculated with some ex-
actitude, the antecedents have become so complicated 
that it is very unlikely they will ever recur. Hence, if 
this were the principle involved, science would re-
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  Hume’s analysis marks the end of any hope that science 
should involve certainty, or unconditional and invariable 
sequences. In the Rise of Scientific Philosophy, Hans 
Reichenbach writes, 
  Empiricism broke down under Hume’s criticism of 
induction, because it had not freed itself from a fun-
damental rationalist postulate, the postulate that all 
knowledge must be demonstrable as true. For this 
conception the inductive method is unjustifiable, 
since there is no proof that it will lead to true conclu-
sions [17]. 
Science does not depend on unconditional sequences. One 
need not turn to physics to see this; it is more readily recog-
nized in biology, where the subject matter begins with the 
cell, whose behavior is conceptualized as a random dynami-
cal process. This does not mean that science is ungrounded, 
only that it must be grounded in probability theory, not in 
deterministic logic. 
RANDOMNESS 
  Whereas Hume properly placed knowledge with respect 
to observed regularities into the domain of probability and 
since we wish to consider biological knowledge in a stochas-
tic framework, we need to address another troublesome 
word: “random”. All too often the word “random” is tossed 
about without heed to a rigorous definition. For instance, the 
time between two events, such as between completion of 
transcription to initiation of translation, is said to be random, 
or the occurrence of an event, such as a specific gene muta-
tion, may be described as random. But do expressions such 
as these have meaning? That depends on the possibility of 
defining the notion of randomness. 
  Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary defines the adjective 
“random” as, “without aim or purpose; haphazard” [18]. 
Purpose is defined in two ways. The first is “that which a 
person sets before himself as an object to be reached or ac-
complished; aim; intention; design”. Under this definition, a 
random occurrence is one that is not intended or designed. 
For the two aforementioned biological examples, this would 
say that there is no intended or designed time between the 
completion of transcription and the initiation of translation, 
and that mutations are neither intended nor designed. This is 
clearly not what is meant by “random” in science because 
science, as an empirically based discipline, is not concerned 
with the intention of beings situated outside the phenomena. 
The second Webster definition of purpose is an “end in view; 
the object for which something exists or is done”. Under this 
definition, a random occurrence is one without object. For 
our two examples, we see no way of making this definition 
relevant to the timing between transcription and translation; 
however, it could be applied to say that mutations occur 
without an end in view. But this latter interpretation puts us 
back into the domain of causality because it says that muta-
tions occur without final cause and even Bacon considers 
final causality as part of metaphysics.  
  Although we cannot appeal to Webster’s Dictionary for a 
definition of randomness insofar as science is concerned, the 
relation to final cause opens the door to an alternative view 
of randomness, that a random event is one not determined by 
causality. Here there is a mixture of two concepts, determin-
ism and causality. Let us first dismiss causality because if a 
random event were defined as a non-causal event, then ran-
domness would be defined as a negation of a nonscientific 
category and therefore would, itself, be nonscientific. Hence, 
we arrive at a random event being one that is not determined. 
But this throws us back upon determinism as a category per-
taining to phenomena, absent a notion of causality; however, 
determinism is meaningless as a scientific category because 
the hypothesis of determinism is phenomenally vacuous. 
Thus, if randomness is the negation of phenomenal deter-
minism, then it, too, is meaningless. 
  Randomness is indeed related to determinism, not in 
terms of phenomena but rather in how we treat phenomena 
within science. Since science is about relations, scientific 
knowledge involves the representation of relations. Since 
scientific sensibility involves measurements, either logical or 
numerical, scientific knowledge concerns relations between 
measurements. Finally, because we are interested measure-
ments of recurring phenomena, the objects to be related take 
the form of abstract symbols, called “variables”, that repre-
sent measurements, such as distance, time, protein abun-
dance, etc. An example is the time r between transcription 
and translation. For a specific instance, r represents a single 
measurement and takes the mathematical form of a real 
number. However, our interest is not with a single observa-
tion of time but rather the class of measurements. Thus, the 
time between transcription and translation varies depending 
on a host of conditions within the cell and the time is repre-
sented as a random variable, which we will denote by R. 
Here, the word “random” appears as part of the term “ran-
dom variable”, which has a precise mathematical definition. 
The nature of the random variable R is more subtle than that 
of a simple real number and it was not until the twentieth 
century that we had a suitable definition of a random vari-
able, that being a “measurable function” from a “probability 
space” into the space of real numbers. This definition re-
quires the definitions of a measurable function and a prob-
ability space, which in turn requires the definition of a prob-
ability measure, the upshot being that it requires the devel-
opment of the mathematical theory of measure to be able to 
give meaning to the word “random” in regard to its scientific 
usage.  
  Let us extend this simple case to one more representative 
of a biological system. Consider a dynamical process, say 
the amount of the protein product, Wnt5a, corresponding to 
the gene WNT5A, in a cell. Dynamically, this measurement 
is represented as a variable of the form x(t), where t denotes 
time and x(t) is a numerical value whose units depend upon 
the measurement procedure. If we track this abundance for a 
single cell, we get a time function that is deterministic, the 
latter meaning, by definition, that there is a certain value at 
each time point. However, we are typically interested in the 
behavior of Wnt5a for an arbitrary cell and, then, the meas-
urement is not deterministic, the abundance trajectory being 
different for different cells. In this case the measurement is 
represented as a time-dependent random variable, denoted 
X(t), again the word “random” appearing as part of the 
mathematical term “random variable”. The deterministic 
variable x(t) takes values in some numerical space, such as 
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ing on the quantization of the measurement procedure. The 
random variable X(t) is a function from a probability space 
into a numerical space. Whereas as x(t) is referred to as a “ 
time function”, X(t) is referred to as a “random time func-
tion”, a “random time process”, or a “stochastic process”. In 
every instance the word “random” is used, it requires a defi-
nition in terms of the underlying mathematical spaces. None 
of this makes any suppositions concerning things-in-
themselves. In the context of science, “random” is simply a 
word adopted by mathematics and defined therein within the 
framework of axiomatic probability theory.  
  To see what happens when one tries to use the word 
“random” loosely, consider the following statement by Fran-
cisco Ayala: 
  Mutations are said to be accidental, undirected, ran-
dom, or chance events. These terms are often used as 
synonyms, but there are at least three different senses 
in which they are predicated of the mutation process. 
First, mutations are accidental or chance events, in the 
sense that they are rare exceptions to the regularity of 
the process of DNA replication, which normally in-
volves precise copying of the hereditary information, 
encoded in the nucleotide sequences. Second, muta-
tions are accidental, random, or chance events also 
because there is no way of knowing whether a given 
gene or genome will mutate in a particular cell or in a 
particular generation. We cannot predict which indi-
viduals will have a new mutation and which ones will 
not, nor can we predict which gene will mutate in a 
given individual. This does not imply that no regulari-
ties exist in the mutation process; the regularities are 
associated with stochastic processes, to which prob-
abilities can be assigned. There is a definite probabil-
ity (although it may not have been ascertained) that a 
given gene will mutate in any given individual. 
Moreover, it is not true that a mutation is just as likely 
to occur as any other mutation. Third, mutations are 
accidental, undirected, random, or chance events in a 
sense that is very important for evolution; they are 
unoriented with respect to adaptation [19]. 
  Note the terms Ayala is grouping with “random”. Both 
“accidental” and “undirected” agree with Webster because 
they relate to unintended events. So it seems that he is in 
agreement with Webster and at the outset leaves the domain 
of science for psychology or metaphysics. Yet his first defi-
nition does not speak of intent; rather, he uses randomness to 
describe a process that exhibits rare exceptions to regularity, 
hence, seeming to imply that randomness applies to a non-
causal process, in the sense of Mill, thereby making it, at 
best, a metaphysical category or, at worst, meaningless. 
Skipping momentarily to the third definition, this defines 
random as being non-causal in the sense of final cause, again 
metaphysical. The second definition is the only one suitable 
for science. Although he does not go into a careful mathe-
matical characterization of mutations forming a stochastic 
process, one can be given. Ayala’s contention that all three 
definitions are used in biology is where the problem lies. The 
first and third have nothing to do with science, so that their 
use pollutes biological knowledge – the result of a lack of 
attention to sound epistemology.  
INTELLIGIBILITY 
  When Newton writes, “And to us it is enough that gravity 
does really exist”, he is bracketing causality along with 
whatever “physical” substance is represented by the phe-
nomena observed. What perhaps Newton did not realize is 
that this bracketing would become permanent in the sense 
that today there is no explanation of gravitation as a physical 
substance; indeed, one is hard pressed to say what is meant 
by a “physical substance”. What is certain, however, is that 
the Newtonian gravitational law and the more modern theo-
ries in terms of the curvature of space are mathematically 
clear and make excellent predictions. When discussing the 
enormity of the transformation wrought by Galileo and New-
ton, Morris Kline writes, “What science has done, then, is to 
sacrifice physical intelligibility for the sake of mathematical 
description and mathematical prediction” [20]. Sacrificing 
physical intelligibility does not involve an abandonment of 
knowledge; on the contrary, it involves the recognition that 
everyday human categories concerning Nature – those that 
arise from the ordinary interaction with the physical world, 
such as pushing and pulling – are not suitable for describing 
phenomenal relations. Kline goes on to say, 
  The insurgent seventeenth century found a qualitative 
world whose study was aided by mathematical ab-
stractions. It bequeathed a mathematical, quantitative 
world that subsumed under its mathematical laws the 
concreteness of the physical world. In Newton’s time 
and for two hundred years afterwards, physicists 
spoke of the action of gravity as ‘action at a distance’, 
a meaningless phrase that was accepted as a substitute 
for explaining the physical mechanism, much as we 
speak of spirits or ghosts to explain unseen phenom-
ena [20]. 
  Consider the electromagnetic field theory that is respon-
sible for so much technology in the modern world. The the-
ory, rooted in James Clerk Maxwell’s equations, is com-
pletely understood because it is a mathematical theory. Its 
applications depend on the behavior of detectors as predicted 
by the theory. But what is the nature of the physical sub-
stance behind these? In On Faraday’s Lines of Force, Max-
well explains how he will analogize lines of force as “fine 
tubes of variable section carrying an incompressible fluid”. 
He writes, 
  I propose, then, first to describe a method by which 
the motion of such a fluid can be clearly conceived; 
secondly to trace the consequences of assuming cer-
tain conditions of motion, and to point out the appli-
cation of the method to some of the less complicated 
phenomena of electricity, magnetism, and galvanism; 
and lastly to shew how by an extension of these 
methods, and the introduction of another idea due to 
Faraday, the laws of the attractions and inductive ac-
tions of magnets and currents may be clearly con-
ceived, without making any assumptions as to the 
physical nature of electricity, or adding anything to 
that which has been already proved by experiment. 
By referring everything to the purely geometrical idea 
of the motion of an imaginary fluid, I hope to attain 
generality and precision, and to avoid the dangers 
arising from a premature theory professing to explain 
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The key point is that Maxwell obtains his theory “without 
making any assumptions as to the physical nature of electric-
ity”.  
  Although the theory is fully consistent with experimental 
measurements, Maxwell is not fully satisfied because the 
theory lacks physical intelligibility. He continues, 
  If the results of mere speculation which I have col-
lected are found to be of any use to experimental phi-
losophers, in arranging and interpreting their results, 
they will have served their purpose, and a mature the-
ory, in which physical facts will be physically ex-
plained, will be formed by those who by interrogating 
Nature herself can obtain the only true solution of the 
questions which the mathematical theory suggests 
[21]. 
  Maxell’s dissatisfaction arises from the fact that he can-
not explain the theory in purely physical categories. Where 
does the matter sit today? Kline writes: 
  We do not have any physical account of the knowl-
edge of the electromagnetic waves as waves. Only 
when we introduce conductors such as radio antennae 
in electromagnetic fields do we obtain any evidence 
that those fields exist. Yet we send radio waves bear-
ing complex messages thousands of miles. Just what 
substance travels through space we do not know [20]. 
  As Newton brackets causality and the physical nature of 
gravity in favor of mathematical relations, Maxwell brackets 
the physical waves behind the field theory. In general, sci-
ence foregoes physical intelligibility (in the standard Aristo-
telian sense, which is the everyday sense), and constitutes 
knowledge within mathematical structures that allow us to 
build devices that respond according to the equations and 
thereby produce pragmatic effects in the physical world that 
are in some unknown way a result of the bracketed waves. 
  Perhaps there is dissatisfaction, a nostalgic yearning for 
the simple Aristotelian notion that the mind can grab hold of 
reality. On this account Kline remarks,  
  Our mental constructions have outrun our intuitive 
and sense perceptions. In both theories, gravitational 
and electromagnetism, we must confess our ignorance 
of the basic mechanisms and leave the task of repre-
senting what we know to mathematics. We may lose 
pride in making this confession, but we may gain un-
derstanding of the true state of affairs [20]. 
Kline’s use of the word “understanding” is interesting. We 
understand the mathematics, and not the things-in-
themselves, but because the predictions from the mathemat-
ics relate the mathematics to the phenomena, we are closer to 
the true state of affairs, whether in the Humean sense that the 
phenomena are all of which we can speak or in the Kantian 
sense that there are noumena truly existing behind the phe-
nomena. 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
  We have discussed the elimination from science of cau-
sality and other physically intuitive notions and traced the 
evolution of scientific epistemology through Maxwell. We 
believe this is sufficient to have established the basic empiri-
cal-mathematical duality underlying scientific knowledge, 
which we now briefly discuss (see [17] for a thorough treat-
ment of modern scientific epistemology and [4] for a treat-
ment aimed at computational biology). 
  Scientific knowledge necessarily takes the form of 
mathematics for four reasons: (1) scientific knowledge is 
based on quantitative measurements, be they logical or nu-
meric; (2) scientific knowledge concerns relations and 
mathematics provides the formal structure for relations; (3) 
the validity of a scientific theory depends on predictions and 
this requires a quantitative structure from which to generate 
predictions and a theory of probability in which the goodness 
of predictions can be quantified; and (4) mathematics pro-
vides a formal language sufficiently simple so that both the 
constituting theory and the experimental protocols for pre-
diction are inter-subjective, once the underlying mathemati-
cal representation of the theory is agreed upon. A theory 
does not stop at the defining relations; it includes proposi-
tions deduced from the defining relations and this deduction 
can reveal critical relations not at once apparent in the defin-
ing relations. A full mathematical model consists of the de-
fining relations and all relations logically deduced from 
these. 
  While the form of scientific knowledge is mathematical, 
that alone does not provide scientific knowledge because 
scientific knowledge must have an empirical base. Moreo-
ver, scientific knowledge is poorly served by anecdotal ob-
servations; instead it should rely on structured experiments. 
In regard to the movement from unplanned observation to 
probing Nature according to a structured protocol to elicit 
observations directly aimed at constructing or validating a 
set of mathematical relations, Kant asserted, “To this single 
idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping 
in the dark for so many centuries, natural science was at 
length conducted into the path of certain progress” [15]. The 
product of an experiment is a set of measurements. These 
form the data of sensibility, the empirical (as opposed to a 
rational) basis for knowledge. 
  Where is the mathematical model to come from and how 
does one characterize model validity relative to a measure-
ment process? According to Albert Einstein, the mathemati-
cal model, or as he called it, the “conceptual system” is a 
creation of the “imagination”. The manner of this creation is 
not part of the scientific theory. The classical manner is that 
the scientist combines an appreciation of the problem with 
reflections upon relevant phenomena and, based upon 
mathematical knowledge, creates a model. The model arises 
from empirical considerations. But the most critical aspect of 
the relationship between the model and phenomena occurs in 
the validation process because it is the validation process 
that characterizes scientific “truth”.  
  Recalling Hume, regularity in structured observations 
leads to expectation. Thus, there is no truth in the sense of 
logical certainty; scientific truthfulness lies in prediction. As 
Reichenbach states, “Scientific philosophy has constructed a 
functional conception of knowledge, which regards knowl-
edge as an instrument of prediction and for which sense ob-
servation is the only admissible criterion of nonempty truth” 
[17]. A model’s formal structure must lead to experimental 
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model variables and observable phenomena such that ex-
perimental observations are in accord with the predicted val-
ues of corresponding variables. There must be a predictive 
framework for validation because the scientific truth, or va-
lidity, of the model depends on the accuracy of predictions 
arising from the model. This requires the model to be related 
to the experimental methodology. Reichenbach states, “The 
reference to verifiability is a necessary constituent of the 
theory of meaning. A sentence the truth of which cannot be 
determined from possible observations is meaningless” [17]. 
Verification of a system requires that the symbols be tied to 
observations by some semantic rules that relate not necessar-
ily to the general principles of the mathematical model them-
selves but to conclusions drawn from the principles. In other 
words, the theory is tested by checking measurable conse-
quences of the theory. These operational definitions, as they 
are called, are an intrinsic part of the theory, for without 
them there would be no connection between the principles 
and observation. There must be a well-defined procedure for 
relating the consequences of the equations to quantifiable 
observations, such as gene expression in the steady state of a 
gene regulatory network. A scientific theory must have two 
parts: a structural model and a set of operational definitions 
for its symbols. 
  A great power of the scientific epistemology lies in the 
logical deducibility of logically necessary relations from the 
relations defining the model – the hypothetico-deductive 
method. The knowledge constituted by these derived rela-
tions is implicit in the defining mathematical system but only 
becomes apparent when derived explicitly. Often, the most 
striking aspects of a scientific theory are represented by these 
derived relations – for instance, the consequences of New-
ton’s gravitational law and of Maxwell’s equations. In par-
ticular, key applications are typically the result of conse-
quences of the basic model. Moreover, as just noted, model 
validation is achieved via predictions made from the conse-
quences. 
  The preceding prescription does not lead to a unique, 
absolute truth because validation is a process and the “truth” 
of the theory is relative to that process. Einstein states, “In 
order that thinking might not degenerate into ‘metaphysics’, 
or into empty talk, it is only necessary that enough proposi-
tions of the conceptual system be firmly enough connected 
with sensory experiences” [22]. What is left unclear in Ein-
stein’s statement is a precise definition of what is meant by 
“enough propositions” and what it means to be “firmly 
enough connected with sensory experiences”. Operational 
definitions are required, but their exact formulation in a 
given circumstance is left open. Their specification consti-
tutes an epistemological issue that must be addressed in 
mathematical (including logical) statements. Absent such a 
specification, a theory is meaningless. Because a model con-
sists of mathematical relations and system variables must be 
checked against quantitative observations, there is no non-
mathematical way to describe the requirements and protocols 
to assess model validity. Hence, mathematics is essential to 
the structure of the model and its verification. 
  Perhaps the lack of absolute and unique knowledge is 
unsettling to some, as it has been to some of the great minds 
of science. One could take solace in the bracketing of Galileo 
and Newton just because the search for physical truth was 
bracketed and not abandoned. Hume, however, represents a 
coming of age, and from him there is no return – at least if 
one is going to be serious. The critical philosophy of Kant 
was a reaction to Hume but Kant offers little solace to one 
who wants to know physical truth qua Nature. Modern phys-
ics has only accentuated this and, as we will shortly discuss, 
biology drives home the point even further. Let us close this 
section with a quote from Einstein: 
  Physical concepts are free creations of the human 
mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely de-
termined by the external world. In our endeavor to 
understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying 
to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He 
sees the face and the moving hands, even hears it 
ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he 
is ingenious he may form some picture of the mecha-
nism which could be responsible for all the things he 
observes, but he may never be quite sure his picture is 
the only one which could explain his observations. He 
will never be able to compare his picture with the real 
mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibil-
ity of the meaning of such a comparison [23]. 
Kant might have written these words in regard to the futility 
of a scientific search for the things-in-themselves.  
EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CELL 
  Wilhelm Windelband defines epistemology in the follow-
ing way: “The problems, finally, which arise from the ques-
tions concerning the range and limit of man’s knowing fac-
ulty and its relation to the reality to be known form the sub-
ject-matter of epistemology or theory of knowledge” [24]. 
We take the word “range” to refer to the kind, or nature, of 
the knowledge under consideration, many definitions of epis-
temology referring to the nature of knowledge. Thus far, our 
discussion has been on the epistemology of science, in par-
ticular, the nature and limits of scientific knowledge, as well 
as its relation to reality. This relation is via observations of 
the phenomena that result from the things-in-themselves – 
and in that sense we take a Kantian position that there are 
things-in-themselves outside the direct structure of our scien-
tific knowledge, which is constrained by the limits of sensi-
bility. The observations are tied to scientific knowledge, 
which is constituted by mathematics, and the validity of the 
knowledge is relative to predictions based upon the mathe-
matics and tested via operational definitions. All of this is 
general, applying to any branch of science. The epistemol-
ogy of biology has its own unique issues and, therefore, 
unique nature within the general scientific epistemology. 
Biology is not physics, nor is it chemistry. Our problem is 
the nature of biological knowledge, in particular, biological 
knowledge of the cell, as opposed to general physical or 
chemical knowledge of the cell. 
  Biology concerns living organisms. These exist in the 
physical world. Therefore biology depends upon physics. 
Each cell consists of a host of molecules that form the build-
ing blocks of structures within the cell and are involved with 
interactions both interior and exterior to the cell. Therefore 
biology depends upon chemistry. But the subject matter of 
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ogy would be a branch of physics or chemistry. Biology 
concerns the operation of the cell in its pursuit of life, not the 
molecular infrastructure that forms the physiochemical un-
derpinnings of life. The activity within a cell is much like 
that within a factory. In the latter, machines manufacture 
products, energy is consumed, information is stored, infor-
mation is processed, decisions are made, and signals are sent 
to maintain proper factory organization and operation. All of 
these functions also take place within a cell and it is through 
analogy with a factory that we approach the epistemology of 
the cell. 
  The hardware units within a factory, whether mechanical, 
electrical, or chemical, do not constitute the factory. These 
require specialized knowledge to build and are necessary for 
the factory to function but, in and of themselves, they simply 
compose a collection. They become part of a factory when 
their functioning is organized and regulated according to a 
logical program that integrates and orders their activities in 
such a way as to produce the desired products and maintain 
their proper functioning within the overall operation of the 
factory. If we strip away all of the components – the robots, 
the computers, the communication devices, the relays, etc. – 
that is, the units within the factory that could be individually 
used for any number of purposes, what remains, and what 
constitutes the factory as an entity, is the regulatory logic 
that controls the dynamics of the factory.  
  The same can be said for a cell if we strip away that 
which is purely physical and chemical. While it is true that 
transcription factors are required to implement the regulatory 
cell logic, the chemical interactions involved in the function-
ing of the transcription factors are a subject for chemistry, in 
the same way that the electrical impulses that carry the in-
structions to robots in a factory are a subject for physics. One 
can know all of these reactions but be no closer to under-
standing the livingness of the cell. One can list a multitude of 
the interactions between molecules within the cell, as one 
could write down the entire instruction set of a computer, but 
without the program that regulates the manner in which the 
instructions are used, there are only the symbols of codes, 
not functioning codes that convey information.  
  A first and necessary step for modeling cellular processes 
and their regulation is, therefore, to begin to consider what 
level of regulation would be a useful target of study. This 
consideration is a form of detail triage that must be applied 
as a consequence of the considerable complexity in some 
types of cellular regulation. At the simplest level of regula-
tion, the core functions of metabolism deal with the most 
basic and ubiquitous functions required for the cell to be able 
to carry out any further function. As would be expected for 
functions that have been continuously selected for continuity 
of operation and maximal efficiency for as long as organisms 
have existed, their regulation is tuned to maximize the opera-
tional utility of individual steps. There are some cases where 
these processes may need a large regulatory adjustment, such 
as hypoxia, or scarcity of an exogenously supplied carbon 
source used to derive energy or construct macromolecules. 
Yet for the most part, adaptations of the processes to varia-
tion in source materials and requirements for energy on the 
input side and energy expenditure and molecular construc-
tion on the output side fall well within the capability of 
adjustments determined at the local level.  
  There are critical issues that a well-run factory must con-
front, each with an analog within the cell. A factory, or com-
puter system, must handle interrupts. A factory is not a 
closed system. It has inputs and outputs, and it also has un-
planned emergencies, such as the failure of some component, 
the loss of its primary energy supply, or a change in the de-
mand for its products. Interrupts do not occur with fixed 
regularity, and in this sense every input can be considered an 
interrupt because the timing of input arrivals cannot be syn-
chronously regulated. In order that the factory not com-
pletely shut down for an extended time, which could result in 
economic failure, its operational program must have proce-
dures for redirecting the activities within the factory to han-
dle the interrupt until such time that the effects of the inter-
rupt have passed and the factory can return to normal func-
tion, a sort of homeostasis. Consequently, a factory’s activi-
ties must be modeled stochastically. Basically, while all 
nodes within the factory may appear to function with com-
plete regularity under “normal” functioning, in fact, the fac-
tory is affected by many latent variables unaccounted for no 
matter how complex the model and these give the factory a 
stochastic character.  
  Cells have a similar approach to managing their re-
sponses to critical changes that could lead to death or sub-
stantial damage to the organism. These actions fall in the 
category of stress responses, system-wide alterations that 
deal with various environmental insults and cellular mal-
functions. In these situations, many processes may need to 
be halted and many others instituted. A familiar example of 
this kind of regulation is the response to damage from ioniz-
ing radiation. At this level of regulation, the concept of cellu-
lar context becomes evident. An organism has many differ-
ent kinds of cells and reacts to damage to them in quite dif-
ferent ways. Cells that produce the precursors of short-lived 
cells needing frequent replacement, such as blood cells or 
cells that line the gut, are typically much more likely to in-
voke a death response when their DNA is damaged than cell 
types like neurons, which are very slow to replicate. The 
same stimulus is interpreted in different ways in these cells 
even though the mechanism of recognizing the damage is the 
same. In these cases, the interpretation of the recognition of 
damage is conditioned by interactions with different genes 
present in the different cell types. In regulatory processes, 
where chains of signals are used to induce systemic changes 
in the functions a cell is currently performing, the presence 
or absence of particular gene products that mediate the turn-
ing on and off of the production or function of the gene 
products targeted by the regulatory action can be used to 
specify whether one or another particular bank of genes will 
be acted on and whether the action will be an induction or 
cessation of their action. This capacity to use a single detec-
tor of a particular environmental shift to specify differing 
particular responses for cell types posing distinct types or 
levels of risk to the organism in their reaction to a threaten-
ing environmental action or an internal malfunction is one of 
the ways in which cells have developed to provide the organ-
ism in which they reside with the optimal response to a par-
ticular type of damage.  
  It is common for a factory, or computer system, to func-
tion on a clock, meaning that the timing of activities is quan-
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crete time intervals, 0, , 2, 3,…. This is accomplished via 
delays that hold operations so that new operations begin only 
at times that are multiples of the basic period . For instance, 
think of a classical human assembly line, where each task is 
accomplished during a time interval k to (k + 1). No matter 
when within the interval the task is completed, the next task 
is not begun until the time interval is completed. Another 
example, and one highly relevant to cells, concerns processes 
that require multiple inputs, for instance, the assembly of a 
product that requires multiple pre-assembled components. 
When assembly is clock-regulated, product assembly begins 
at a clock tick, even if all components are in place. This kind 
of coordination by a clock results in synchronous operation. 
A more efficient way to operate is to do away with a clock 
and base all activity on readiness. For instance, the next step 
in assembly begins with the completion of the previous step, 
without waiting for a clock tick. Product assembly com-
mences once all components have arrived, excess compo-
nents being held in queues awaiting their part in assembly. In 
a computer system, this means that instructions are executed 
once all necessary inputs (data and logical inputs) are ready. 
This kind of execute-when-ready system results in asyn-
chronous operation and, in the context of computation, is 
sometimes referred to as a data-flow system. Asynchronous 
operation is more efficient but also more difficult to control, 
requiring more complex regulatory logic. Ignoring interrupts, 
a synchronous system can be modeled deterministically, but 
an asynchronous system is inherently stochastic because 
variability in individual operation times is not normalized by 
clock periods. Nevertheless, if the regulatory logic can han-
dle an asynchronous system, there is significant gain in effi-
ciency. 
  A factory requires redundancy to keep operations running 
smoothly. In the worst case scenario, the failure of a single 
operation can halt factory operations. These kinds of cata-
strophic failures are avoided by eliminating their points of 
occurrence or, perhaps more simply, building in redundant 
operations, for instance, back-up generators. Multiple sub-
systems can be employed with back-up capabilities. Optimi-
zation of redundancy is nontrivial because too much redun-
dancy renders the overall operation too costly. Redundancy 
is made more efficient by using subsystems that can perform 
multiple tasks and therefore be able to serve as back-ups 
when needed. If a unit fails, the regulatory logic needs to be 
able to reconfigure the operations automatically to maintain 
productivity, albeit, perhaps at a reduced level if back-up 
systems are less efficient (and therefore less costly). Fault 
tolerance is enhanced by the ability for autonomous correc-
tion of failures, for instance, by error correction code that 
checks for faults and corrects these faults when discovered. 
Regarding the development of control systems to regulate 
this kind of autonomous reconfiguration, Pugachev writes, 
  It is also feasible to distinguish another category of 
control systems which are capable of analyzing their 
own operating conditions and using this information 
to produce an optimum performance. The simplest 
systems of this type, which incorporate elements for 
automatically adjusting particular parameters accord-
ing to an analysis of input and output data, are called 
self-adjusting systems. Complex systems of this kind 
are capable of adapting themselves completely at 
each instant to the results of their analysis of external 
conditions and previous performance. These are said 
to be self-organizing. It is quite clear that no theory of 
error under average operating conditions is adequate 
for the design of self-adjusting and self-organizing 
systems. A special theory is required which will solve 
the complex problems involved in processing the in-
put data and utilizing it to best advantage in any par-
ticular case. Both problems can be tackled by the 
modern theory of optimal systems [7]. 
Self-organization is more than simple redundancy. It allows 
a system to reconfigure itself to achieve optimal (practically, 
close to optimal) performance under varying conditions. 
  A fundamental way to achieve redundancy, as well as 
efficiency, is through the use of parallelism. Parallel assem-
bly of independent components is obviously beneficial, as is 
regulatory parallelism. If a sequence of signals must be sent 
to various points in the system to result in a final instruction, 
then fault tolerance is achieved by sending multiple signals 
through different paths. If one path is blocked, the signal will 
still arrive via another. In fact, the final instruction may be 
assembled from packets of code that have been sent through 
multiple channels with the packets including instructions on 
how they should be assembled at the endpoint. This ap-
proach provides both redundancy and enhanced speed of 
operation in cases where one channel is slowed owing to too 
much traffic or technical problems. In such a system, any 
channel or processor may be carrying or implementing many 
tasks simultaneously.  
  Cells also use redundancy and parallelism to deal opti-
mally with damage and malfunction. Redundancy is com-
monly observed in a cell’s response to ionizing radiation. 
One gene involved in a wide variety of stress related re-
sponses is tumor protein 53 (TP53). TP53 serves as a central 
hub in the network of stress response and it can activate an 
array of responses, yet it is not always required for the occur-
rence of such responses. Many stress response processes can 
be successfully mounted even in the absences of this protein, 
even though when TP53 is present it drives that particular 
process. In these cases, other proteins have been identified 
that are competent to drive the response in TP53’s absence. 
Such redundancy offers a sound way for cells to minimize 
the risk of failure of a critical function. 
  To study regulation in metabolic processes, the appropri-
ate experimental designs and analyses will necessarily differ 
from the designs and analyses used for examining regulation 
in stress response. In shifting from regulatory relationships 
that are simple, linear, context-independent, and not highly 
branched to those that are complex, nonlinear, context-
dependent, redundantly represented and both highly 
branched and interpenetrating, one must take into account 
the vastly increased number of ways the process of interest 
can be configured. Consider the consequences of carrying 
out a stress response study where the experimental plan is 
based on linear expectations, such as challenging a cell line 
with wild-type TP53 and a mutated derivative of that cell 
line not producing functional TP53, and then determining 
which genes are induced by radiation in the TP53
wt line that 
were not induced in the TP53
mut line. If one were to interpret 
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the TP53
wt line and not in the TP53
mut line are normally de-
pendent on TP53
wt, one would be substantially in error. The 
numerous TP53
wt responses that can be induced independ-
ently of TP53
wt through redundant mechanisms would be 
incorrectly considered to be not normally dependent on 
TP53
wt. Confronting this problem requires one to envision a 
different type of network architecture, where the possible 
antecedents of a step in a pathway are multiple and produce 
the same outcome. One way to do so is to formulate a test 
that asks what happens when the gene of interest is active. If 
the results in that case are in agreement with the results when 
it is inactive, it must be considered as a possible controlling 
gene for which there is a redundant controller. This obvi-
ously is not definitive; however, it will identify realistic pos-
sibilities that would not even be considered by an analysis 
that makes linear assumptions. 
  Closely related to parallelism is locality: operating deci-
sions should, wherever possible, be made at the local level. 
This means that control is distributed throughout the factory. 
Hierarchical control suffers from at least three serious flaws. 
First, it is unable to efficiently respond to changed conditions 
at the local level. If a machine is beginning to operate unsat-
isfactorily, perhaps needing overhaul or replacement, this is 
seen immediately at the local level and, presuming the ability 
to rectify the situation exists at the local level, is most effi-
ciently handled there, or as close to the operational location 
as possible to maintain overall functioning of the system. If a 
long chain of command is required to make the decision as 
to how to proceed, this takes time and can lead to a delay in 
decision-making, and thus a consequent down time. A sec-
ond problem with hierarchical control is fragility. The longer 
the chain of command, the more likely it will be broken 
along the way and no decision be forthcoming – in an ex-
treme case, the center of the hierarchical regulatory system 
might fail, thereby brining the entire factory to a stop. Fi-
nally, a long hierarchical chain can result in the decision 
resting in the hands of a decision-maker less qualified rela-
tive to the specific machine.  
  As stated in our discussion about metabolism, the func-
tions most commonly shared and heavily engineered by se-
lection, have extremely local regulation of activity. In many 
cases, the enzymes that carry out a particular function are 
autoregulatory, having interactions with the metabolite that 
they produce that let them adjust their level of catalytic ac-
tivity based on the local abundance of their product. The 
fineness of this control is sufficient to produce both high 
levels of rapid adaptability to fluctuations anywhere in the 
network of operations and a level of stability that centrally 
driven regulation cannot achieve. 
  When observing a factory involving many subsystems, 
the high dimensionality of the operation is typically appar-
ent, but what might be overlooked by the casual observer is 
the multivariate character of the individual decisions or op-
erations within the overall structure. Multiple inputs are of-
ten required before execution. It is not simply that multiple 
components are required to execute a specific assembly; 
more significantly, multiple signals are required for a regula-
tory decision. For instance, there may be numerous sensors 
detecting changes in performance at various points and a 
decision to check a unit or pull it out of service may depend 
on multiple sensory signals. So too might a decision to over-
ride the standard control within some part of the factory and 
change to some specialized logic, for instance, to deal with 
an interrupt. The incoming signals may be quantized to bi-
nary form, so that binary logic is used to evaluate the multi-
variate information and make a binary decision as to whether 
action is to be taken. In the case of response to a potentially 
catastrophic interrupt, information is directed into some con-
trol point whose default value is 0 but whose value changes 
to 1 to canalize part of the system into a reconfigured state of 
operational control until the threat has passed. A cursory 
view of control points within the factory might reveal a se-
quence of changes, thereby giving the impression that the 
behavior of such a pathway might reveal the regulatory 
logic; however, although each point in this pathway might 
influence its successor, it is highly likely that each point is 
influenced by multiple signals and that the pathway only 
represents a trace of this activity along a certain set of points, 
not a dynamical trajectory in the full state space. In this 
sense, such a pathway represents marginal knowledge of the 
operations. 
  Similar difficulties in ascertainment are encountered in 
biology. In cells, not only are there multiple inputs involved 
in a decision, there are alterations in the hardware compo-
nents that interpret the inputs, making the responses context-
sensitive. In these cases, in addition to having multiple con-
troller genes direct the same operation, a controller gene will 
now provoke a particular response only part of the time. This 
occurs when a controlling gene is capable of acting to pro-
duce a certain set of regulatory results only when its actions 
are interpreted by a particular set of gene products that are 
variably present. If one examines a set of samples in which 
such variable interpretation is acting, using an analytical 
approach that measures correlation of gene transcription on 
the assumption that a gene exerting a controlling effect on a 
target gene should show strong correlation in expression 
activity, then the context-dependent controller will likely be 
overlooked. Its correlation with its contextually controlled 
targets is only evident when the controller is in the proper 
context. This is a widespread problem in gene control, since 
in the cell, every gene being expressed is regulated by other 
genes and frequently there are multiple regulatory conditions 
for a gene to be expressed, so that any set of samples is 
likely to have many genes being controlled by different 
genes in different samples, thereby making simple correla-
tion a poor way to identify regulatory connections.  
  While biologists are aware of the variety and frequency 
of both multiplicity of control and redundancy of control, the 
extent to which these and other deviations from simple line-
arity of control confound analysis apparently has yet to have 
a determining influence on how biological systems are ana-
lyzed. 
  Once a factory exceeds a very small number of intercon-
nected components, coordinating its operations goes beyond 
a commonsense, nonmathematical approach. Reminded of 
Galileo’s disparagement of words as constituting knowledge 
in the case of gravity, the situation with a complex system is 
orders of magnitude more resistant to everyday language and 
intuition. There are two basic operational issues concerning a 
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we want to characterize the input and output of the factory; 
second, we want to organize the operations so as to achieve 
optimal (or at least satisfactory) performance. Both charac-
terization and control require a suitable conceptualization of 
the factory. Such a conceptualization must be mathematical 
for two reasons. First, characterization and control involve 
relations among the components and mathematics provides a 
relational language, and second, mathematics provides a 
language in which complexity can be represented in such a 
way as to be amenable to human analysis. Moreover, not 
only are complex systems beyond ordinary intelligibility and 
intuition – indeed, their performance is often highly counter-
intuitive – but they typically cannot be fully represented 
mathematically because there are too many relations and, 
even should one achieve a very precise and highly involved 
mathematical description, it may well be intractable relative 
to solutions of the problems of interest, such as optimizing 
some set of relations within the system. Hence, rather than 
completely characterize system outputs in terms of system 
inputs, we satisfy ourselves with characterizing properties of 
the output in relation to certain properties of the input. In 
such typical situations we try to select variables on the input 
side that have big impact on important variables on the out-
put side.  
  Given that biology appears to be solving its control prob-
lems using the same sorts of approaches but doing so in a 
much more complex environment, it would be reasonable to 
assume that progress in biological science will require adopt-
ing the same stance as engineering has already found useful, 
and necessary, in dealing with complexity – with the con-
straints being even more demanding in biology owing to a 
much greater degree of complexity. Hence, research must 
focus on finding levels of operation of biological control 
where prediction based on some input variables produces 
useful levels of prediction on the output variables. 
  Just as a factory’s constituent parts – electrical, mechani-
cal, and chemical – are required for the factory to exist, the 
physical-chemical constituent parts of a cell are required for 
the cell to exist. Moreover, just as the constituent parts of a 
factory do not constitute the factory, but rather the regulatory 
(operational) logic of the factory defines the factory as an 
operational system whose purpose is to consume energy, 
maintain itself, and produce an output, the constituent parts 
of a cell do not constitute the cell, but rather the regulatory 
(operational) logic of the cell defines the cell as an opera-
tional system whose purpose is to consume energy, maintain 
itself, and propagate. For both factory and cell, the regula-
tory logic determines the relations between the physical 
structures within the system and between the system and its 
environment. By regulatory logic we do not simply refer to 
simple binary deterministic logic but to mathematical func-
tions, perhaps binary in nature, that provide operational con-
trol within the framework of random processes. The roles of 
regulatory logic in the factory (or complex machine) and the 
cell are congruent because the key to the characterization of 
this logic lies in communication (between components) and 
control (of components) – that is, in systems theory, which 
therefore determines the epistemology of the cell.  
  To illustrate key epistemological points, we consider a 
regulatory model that incorporates several of these points, 
including latency, context-dependence, distributed regula-
tion, multivariate gene interaction, and stochasticity [25]. 
Because regulation is parallel and distributed, if one views 
the cascade of activities resulting from the action of a single 
regulatory gene, both the strength and specificity of subse-
quent activities in the cascade may be expected to diffuse 
through subsequent steps in the cascade. As the regulatory 
effects propagate, they are progressively modified or limited 
by interactions with other factors modulating gene transcrip-
tion.  
  One can view genes at various positions in a regulatory 
cascade as being either masters or slaves, keeping in mind 
that this is a relative characterization and that in certain 
situations a gene might act as a master, while in others in 
might act as a slave. If the situation were one of strict, com-
plete control of one gene by another at all times, then gene g 
being a master of gene g1 in a binary ON-OFF genetic regu-
latory model would mean that g  ON implies g1  ON, 
and that g  OFF implies g1  OFF. This kind of strict 
control is not indicative of distributed regulation; indeed, in a 
distributed environment, g  ON would not necessarily im-
ply g1  ON, since g may only be able to set g1  ON in 
coordination with other genes. 
  To illustrate the resulting context-dependent behavior of 
a model system, suppose genes g1 and g2 are fully controlled 
by genes g, g0, and g00 (which may be in turn regulated, or 
affected, by other genes in any number of cascades). Table 1 
shows a possible regulatory structure for five genes and Fig. 
(1) shows a network diagram consistent with this structure. 
Genes g0 and g00 are not part of the model; however, their 
states are physically co-determinative along with the model 
master g of the model slaves g1 and g2. The four possible 
combinations of the states of g0 and g00 determine four pos-
sible contexts, C1, C2, C3, and C4, for the model. Given the 
context, the relationship of the state of g to that of its slaves 
is determinative; however, absent knowledge of the context, 
it is not. If g1 = 1 and g2 = 1 in context C1, then g = 1; if g1 = 
1 and g2 = 1 in context C4, then g = 0. It cannot be that g1 = 1 
and g2 = 1 in contexts C2 and C3. 
Table 1.  Truth Table Showing the Consequences of Regula-
tory Inputs from Genes g, g0, and g00 on Genes g1 and g2 
Contexts  g0  g00  g  g1  g2 
1 1 1 1  1  C1 
1 1 0 0  0 
1 0 1 0  1  C2 
1 0 0 1  0 
0 1 1 1  0  C3 
0 1 0 0  1 
0 0 1 0  0  C4 
0 0 0 1  1 
 
  Conceptually, the regulatory action within the model is 
viewed as a system with inputs corresponding to the regulat-
ing master genes for the slave genes; however, the system is Causality, Randomness, Intelligibility  Current Genomics, 2010, Vol. 11, No. 4    235 
not fully described by the input gene values alone, but by 
these inputs in conjunction with the context. Biologically, 
the context is determined by the manner in which the slaves 
are responding to latent genes external to the model network. 
Together, the latent genes act in a manner as to select a net-
work (system) context. One can imagine a set of input lines 
entering the overall system, a family of subsystems (con-
texts) within the system, and the system output being a sin-
gle line whose information is selected from among the sub-
systems. This would be the structure of a computer system 
whose output is determined by a multiplexer, with the multi-
plexer’s decision being determined by a selection input to it. 
The model system behaves deterministically so long as it 
remains in a fixed context. 
  We now describe the master-slave model [25], restricting 
ourselves to a single master gene g and a corresponding set S 
= {g1, g2, ..., gr} of slaves (see [25] for a more general for-
mulation). The genes in S may be influenced by genes other 
than g. Let Y be the binary expression value for g and X = 
(X1, X2, ..., Xr) be the binary-valued expression vector for the 
slaves. Control by g is of the following form: if Y = 1, then 
all genes in S take on the value 1 with high probability. We 
let p = P(Y = 1). 
 If  Y = 1, even though the master is ON, context-
dependent regulation may affect the slaves. For any slave gk 
 S, the conditional probability of gk being ON is given by  
P(Xk = 1 | Y = 1) = 1  k, 
where the magnitude of k depends on the extent to which 
the influence of the master on gk is diminished by contextual 
effects. To illustrate the meaning of this conditional prob-
ability, consider Table 1. Partitioning the probability accord-
ing to the contexts yields  
   
P(X1 =1|Y =1) =
P(Y = X1 =1|Cj)P(Cj)
j=1
4

P(Y =1|Cj)P(Cj)
j=1
4

, 
where P(Cj) is the probability of the context Cj. The size of 
1 depends on the conditioning of the contexts and their 
probabilities. Suppose contexts C2 and C4 cannot occur, so 
that P(C2) = P(C4) = 0. Table 1 shows that 
P(Y = X1=1 | C1) = P(Y = 1 | C1)  
and  
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P(Y = X1 = 1 | C3) = P(Y = 1 | C3).  
Thus, P(X1 =1 | Y = 1) = 1 and 1 = 0. Conditioning with the 
control that X1 = 1 when Y = 1 occurs due to contexts C2 and 
C4, so that if they do not occur, there is no such conditioning. 
A similar analysis applies to P(X2 = 1 | Y = 1), and in this 
case conditioning with the control that X2 = 1 when Y = 1 
occurs due to contexts C3 and C4. We refer to k as the condi-
tioning parameter.  
 If  Y = 0, then the probability that Xk = 1 depends on con-
textual effects when the master is not actively regulating the 
slaves. We let 
P(Xk = 1 | Y = 0) = k.  
From Table 1, partitioning the probability according to the 
contexts yields  
   
P(X1 =1|Y = 0) =
P(Y = 0,X1 =1|Cj)P(Cj)
j=1
4

P(Y = 0|Cj)P(Cj)
j=1
4

. 
Again suppose contexts C2 and C4 cannot occur. From Table 
1, we see that  
P(Y = 0, X1 = 1 | C1) = P(Y = 0 , X1 = 1 | C3) = 0,  
so that P(X1 = 1 | Y = 1) = 0 and k = 0. A positive value of 
k means that it can be that X1 = 1 absent the forcing control 
of the master when Y = 1. A similar analysis applies to P(X2 
= 1 | Y = 0). We refer to k as the crosstalk parameter be-
cause genes outside the model are turning the slaves on.  
  The model is determined by the two conditional prob-
abilities defining the conditioning and crosstalk parameters. 
They characterize our understanding of regulation in the 
model. If there is very little conditioning and little crosstalk, 
then k is substantially smaller than 1  k. 
  Crosstalk poses implications for experimental design. 
Suppose one takes a large number of samples over unknown 
contexts. It may be that a master exhibits tight control (per-
haps with no external conditioning) across all study samples, 
but when that master is not on, the behavior of the slaves is 
controlled by other genes. If under this other control the 
slaves are uniformly distributed ON and OFF, we have the 
situation k = 0.5. If the probability mass of the contexts in 
which g  OFF greatly outweighs the mass of those con-
texts for which g  ON, then the determinative effect of g 
on the slaves can be very low across the study samples. Es-
sentially, the experimenter is blinded. Even worse, the ex-
perimenter can be severely fooled. If the slaves are mostly 
OFF outside the control of the master, so that the crosstalk 
parameter is very small, even if the master exhibits little con-
trol when it is ON, it might well show a stronger determina-
tive effect than a master that exhibits tight control but has 
slaves that respond significantly to experimental conditions 
outside the study examples for which the master is ON.  
CONCLUSION 
  Biology studies relations between molecules (chemical 
structures), not the molecules or the forces between mole-
cules. The recognition that biological knowledge concerns 
regulatory logic and the consequent intra-cell operational 
organization of molecular structures, as well as, by exten-
sion, inter-cell organization, entails the concomitant recogni-
tion that biological systems, in their extraordinary complex-
ity, are beyond everyday intelligibility and intuition. Moreo-
ver, it facilitates answers to the two fundamental epistemo-
logical questions raised in the Introduction: (1) What form 
does biological knowledge take? (2) How is biological 
knowledge validated? The question as to form relates to the 
type of mathematics involved in modeling the relations that 
characterize regulatory knowledge. This depends on the na-
ture of the relations being considered; however, the general 
mathematical framework will be formed within the theory of 
stochastic multivariate dynamical processes. Validation de-
pends on the mathematical model characterizing the knowl-
edge and, since this knowledge concerns operational regula-
tion, validation will involve operational predictions derived 
from the mathematical model.  
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